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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
DEBRA S. RETHERFORD, : 
Plaintiff and Appellant, : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. : 
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF THE : Case No. 890464 
MOUNTAIN STATES, INC.; 
CATHY BATESON: LOUISE : Priority No. 16 
JOHNSON: VICKIE RANDALL: 
DOE I THROUGH DOE X, : 
Defendants and Appellees. : 
* * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has .jurisdiction of this Appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Sec. 78-2-2 (.j) and Rule 3 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does Utah recognize a cause of action for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy? The District Court's 
determination of this issue constitutes a legal conclusion and 
is reviewable under the correction of error standard of review. 
Arnold v. Titan Services Company, 121 UAR 4, 5 (Utah, 1989) * 
2c Does Utah allow a cause of action for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy only for at will 
employees? The District Court's determination of this issue 
•constitutes a legal conclusion, and is reviewable under the 
correction of error standard of review. Id. 
3. Are Plaintiff's claims for wrongful termination 
and negligent employment pre-empted by Federal or State Anti-
Discrimination Statutes? The District Court's determination 
of this issue constitutes et legal conclusion, and is review-
able under the correction of error standard of review. Id. 
4. Are Plaintiff's claims pre-empted by Federal Labor 
Law? The District Court's determination of this issue con-
stitutes a legal conclusion, and is reviewable under the 
correction of error standard of review. Id. 
5. Are Plaintiff's claims barred for failure to exhaust 
contractual remedies? The District Court's determination of 
this issue constitutes a lejgal conclusion, and is reviewable 
under the correction of error standard of review. Id. 
6. Are Plaintiff's claims for negligent employment, 
breach of implied contract,, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress barred by limitations? The District 
Court's determination of this issue constitutes a legal 
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conclusion, and is reviewable under the correction of error 
standard of review. Id. 
7. Has Plaintiff stated a claim against the individual 
Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress? 
The District Court's determination of this issue at least 
arguably constitutes a finding of fact. However, inasmuch 
as such finding was made pursuant to a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, it is reviewable under the correction of error 
standard of review. Utah State Coalition of Senior 
Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Company, 776 P.2d 632, 
634 (Utah, 1989). 
8. Has Plaintiff stated a claim against the indivi-
dual Defendants for interference with contractual relations? 
The District Court's determination of this issue at least 
arguably constitutes a finding of fact. However, inasmuch 
as such finding was made pursuant to a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, it is reviewable under the correction of error 
standard of review. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
This Court's interpretation of Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 34-35-7.1(11) may be dispositive of certain issues on 
this Appeal. That section provides: 
The procedures contained in this section and 
Section 34-35-8 are the exclusive remedy under 
state law for employment discrimination because 
of race, color, age, religion, national origin, 
or handicap. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff commenced this action in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on April 5, 
1989. Plaintiff's Verified Complaint (R. 2-22) alleges causes 
of action against AT&T for wrongful termination, breach of 
implied contract, and negligent employment, and against each 
of the named individual Defendants for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, and interference with contractual 
relations. Plaintiff's Verified Complaint also includes a 
cause of action against JoLene Gailey for invasion of privacy. 
On May 18, 1989, JoLene Gailey was dismissed, without 
prejudice, as a defendant in this action as a result of 
Gailey's having filed a Chapter 7 Petition in Bankruptcy 
on February 15, 1989. 
On June 1, 1989, Defendants filed their Motion to Dis-
miss all of the claims alleged within Plaintiff's Verified 
Complaint on various grounds. Following the submission of 
Affidavits and Legal Memoranda by both parties, the District 
Court, per the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, issued its 
Minute Entry, dated September 5, 1989, which treated Defen-
dants' Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
granted said Motion in its entirety, "for the reasons specified 
in the memoranda in support thereof." (R. 318). An Order to 
the same effect was signed by Judge Frederick on December 6, 
_ 4 . 
1989, (R. 324-25), which constitutes the final Order from 
which this Appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff was initially employed as a telephone 
operator by Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company 
in Grand Junction, Colorado, during April, 1976, (R. 205). 
2. During February, 1983, pursuant to the nationwide 
divestiture of AT&T, Plaintiff transferred to the "Wasatch 
Office" of AT&T, located in Salt Lake City, Utah, where 
Plaintiff continued her employment with AT&T as a telephone 
operator. (R. 205). 
3. Subsequent to Plaintiff1s transfer to the Wasatch 
Office, Plaintiff became aware that sexually-oriented conduct 
and communications were common-place at the Wasatch Office. 
(R. 205). 
4. Shortly after Plaintiff's transfer to the Wasatch 
Office, Plaintiff was contacted by her Manager, Fayonne 
Johanneson, for the purpose of discussing the employees' 
Code of Conduct published by AT&T. (R. 115-140). During 
such conversation, Plaintiff was required to sign an entry 
in her work records indicating that she had discussed and 
understood the contents of said Code of Conduct. Such pro-
cedure was repeated on a yearly basis, with Plaintiff dis-
cussing the Code of Conduct with whomever was her manager 
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at the time. While certain minor revisions to the Code of 
Conduct were made from year to year, upon information and 
belief, the provisions concerning sexual harassment and 
retaliation, and designating AT&T's EEO Coordinator's Office 
as a procedure for remedying such conduct, remained the same 
throughout Plaintiff's employment with AT&T. Upon further 
information and belief, all telephone operators of AT&T were 
required to review and endorse the Code of Conduct on a yearly 
basis as a condition of their continued employment with AT&T. 
(R. 205-206). 
5. During approximately June, 1983, Plaintiff began 
working the night shift at the Wasatch Office, in order to be 
able to spend more time with her daughter during the days. 
(R. 206). 
6. Shortly after Plaintiff's transfer to night shift, 
Plaintiff began to be subjected to advances from Joiene Gailey 
(hereinafter referred to as Gailey), who was at all times 
material hereto an employee of Defendant AT&T sit the Wasatch 
Office, which included a gradually increasing number of 
comments by Gailey concerning Plaintiff's appearance, sug-
gestions that Plaintiff Join Gailey in various activities, 
and physical touching. (R. 206-207). 
7. At approximately the same time as the commencement 
of Gailey's conduct toward Plaintiff referred to in the pre-
ceding paragraph, certain other employees of the Wasatch 
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Office, including Defendants Johnson and Randall, who were, 
upon information and belief, personal friends of Gailey, began 
to congregate around Plaintiff with regularity. Such employees 
frequently conversed explicitly upon subjects of a sexual 
and/or homosexual nature. (R. 207). 
8. During approximately July, 1983, Defendant Johnson 
was overheard by Plaintiff and, upon information and belief, 
by several other employees of the Wasatch Office, loudly des-
cribing in explicit detail a sexual encounter that she had 
allegedly had with a male employee of the Wasatch Office. 
(R. 206). 
9. On or about November 22, 1984, Gailey, who was 
visibly intoxicated at the time, sat next to Plaintiff at work 
and stated words to the effect of "I'm going to save you from 
Dave Todd." On this occasion, Gailey placed her hand upon 
Plaintiff's arm in an affectionate manner, which greatly 
offended Plaintiff. (R. 207). 
10. Subsequent to November 22, 1984, the aforemen-
tioned pattern of conduct perpetrated upon Plaintiff by Gailey 
became progressively more aggressive, to the point where, 
during approximately December of 1984, Gailey asked Plaintiff 
to pose nude while Gailey prepared a picture or sculpture. 
(R. 207). 
11. Shortly following the incident referred to in the 
preceding paragraph, Gailey, on a separate occasion, told 
- 7 -
Plaintiff that she (Gailey) needed to find a roommate, and 
that she hated men and even the sound of men's voices on 
the telephone. When Plaintiff did not respond to these 
statements by Gailey, Gailey grabbed Plaintiff,fs arm and 
said words to the effect of, "Debi, why don't you talk to 
me?" (R. 207-208). 
12. During approximately December, 1983, Plaintiff 
was appointed Union Steward of the Communications Workers of 
America ("CWA") at the Wasatch Office. Upon information and 
belief, CWA was at all times material hereto the exclusive 
bargaining agent for telephone operators of AT&T. (R. 208). 
13. During approximately December, 1983, Plaintiff 
was telephoned at her residence by Gailey. Upon information 
and belief, said telephone call was made by Gailey from the 
Wasatch Office during her working hours. (R. 208). 
14. During approximately January, 1984, a male 
employee of the Wasatch Office passed a note to Plaintiff, 
which note stated that Plaintiff was having an affair with 
a certain other male employee. Upon information and belief, 
Gailey was the originator of the allegation contained within 
the note. (R. 208). 
15. During approximately March, 1984, Gailey tele-
phoned Plaintiff at Plaintiff's residence and asked Plaintiff 
if she intended to file an EEOC Complaint against Gailey. 
Such inquiry was made by Gailey, upon information and belief, 
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pursuant to instructions of Defendant Bateson-Hough. Plain-
tiff responded to this inquiry of Gailey by stating that 
Plaintiff would file an EEOC Complaint if Gailey continued 
to bother Plaintiff. Plaintiff further informed Gailey 
during this conversation that Plaintiff had been offended 
by Gailey's asking Plaintiff to pose nude. Gailey stated 
in response to Plaintiff's comments words to the effect of, 
"I'm sorry if I offended you, but I feel I shouldn't 
apologize for my sexuality." (R. 208-209). 
16. Subsequent to the telephone conversation referred 
to in the preceding paragraph, Gailey and certain other 
employees of the Wasatch Office, including the individual 
Defendants herein, commenced upon a regular practice of 
retaliation and harassment of Plaintiff, which included, 
inter alia, staring at and making threatening facial expres-
sions at Plaintiff, walking close to Plaintiff, following 
Plaintiff, and talking about Plaintiff amongst themselves. 
On one occasion during approximately March, 1984, Plaintiff 
became so upset by this conduct that she was required to 
leave work early. (R. 209). 
17. During approximately March, 1984, Plaintiff, on 
two separate occasions, complained verbally to Supervisor 
Hilda Shelley, and Manager Al Reynolds, concerning the 
harassment and retaliation referred to in the preceding 
paragraph. (R. 209). 
- 9 -
18• On or about May 8, 1984, Gailey assumed a posi-
tion immediately next to PLaintiff on the stand-up computer 
boards at a time when many other positions were available. 
Plaintiff immediately moved to another position. Within 
approximately 10 minutes thereafter, Gailey moved to a 
different position. (R. 209). 
19. On or about May 9, 1984, Plaintiff wrote and 
delivered to Bateson-Hough a letter stating that Gailey had 
continued harassing Plaintiff in spite of Plaintiff's requests 
to Gailey that she not do so. (R. 210). 
20. On or about May 10, 1984, Plaintiff submitted a 
written complaint to the office of the EEO Coordinator for 
AT&T concerning Gailey's harassment of Plaintiff. (R. 210). 
21. On or about May 15, 1984, Plaintiff received a 
telephone call at her residence from Richard Salazar, who 
was at that time, upon information and belief, an employee 
of AT&T and a Union Steward of CWA. During the ensuing tele-
phone conversation, Salazar stated to Plaintiff words to the 
effect of, "You're the new kid on the block — you're not 
going to win this. We don't know you very well, but we do 
know Jolene, she is a respectable person in the community 
and an artist" and "Somebody could get fired over this." 
(R. 210). 
22. On or about May 31, 1984, at approximately 
1:15 a.m., Gailey drove her vehicle at a high rate of speed 
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past Plaintiff while Plaintiff was attempting to cross 
the street to her vehicle. Gailey then proceeded to follow 
Plaintiff south on 1-15 to the 13th South exit. (R. 210). 
23. During June, 1984, the EEO Coordinator's Office 
for AT&T, per Linda Johnston, who was at that time, upon 
information and belief, a personal friend of Bateson-Hough, 
conducted an investigation into Plaintiff's written complaint 
filed on or about May 10, 1984. Said investigation, upon 
information and belief, consisted wholly of personal inter-
views of Plaintiff and Gailey, and the submission of written 
statements by Plaintiff and Gailey. (R. 210-211). 
24. During approximately June, 1984, Plaintiff par-
ticipated in a conversation with Darlene Anderson, who was at 
that time, upon information and belief, a first-level manager 
at the Wasatch Office. Said conversation included a discus-
sion of Plaintiff's problems with Gailey, in regard to which 
Anderson stated to Plaintiff words to the effect of, "Just be 
careful what you say and do; this is a strong and big group 
that you are dealing with." (R. 211). 
25. On or about July 10, 1984, the EEO Coordinator's 
Office for AT&T, per Linda Johnston, submitted its report and 
recommendation in regard to Plaintiff's written complaint of 
May 10, 1984. Said report recommended that Plaintiff and 
Gailey have as little contact with each other as possible in 
the future. (R. 211). 
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26. During approximately July, 1984, following the 
issuance of the report by the EEO Coordinator for AT&T, 
Plaintiff received a telephone call from Reta Pehrson, who 
was, upon information and belief, at that time a supervisor 
for AT&T and Vice President of Telephone Operators for CWA. 
During this conversation, Pehrson stated to Plaintiff words 
to the effect of "You have to be satisfied with the EEO's 
decision" and "If anybody asks you about it, don't tell them 
and don't say anything." (R. 211-212). 
27. During approximately July, 1984, Plaintiff over-
heard an employee of the Wasatch Office, who was at that time 
engaged in a conversation with two other employees, including 
Defendant Johnson, state words to the effect of, "Debi would 
make a good stripper -- she has big boobs." Immediately 
following said statement, Johnson stated, while looking 
directly at Plaintiff, words to the effect of, "My bra size 
is 34B." (R. 212). 
28. Subsequent to the issuance of the EEO Coor-
dinator's report on or about July 10, 1984, Gailey and 
her friends at the Wasatch office, including Defendants 
Johnson and Randall, continued to stare at and make hostile 
facial expressions toward Plaintiff, to follow Plaintiff, 
to walk and sit close to Plaintiff, and to talk about Plain-
tiff amongst themselves. On one occasion during approxi-
mately August, 1984, an employee of the Wasatch Office, 
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stated to Plaintiff words to the effect of, "Debi, they*re 
all staring at you." (R. 212). 
29. On or about August 9, 1984, Plaintiff witnessed 
a female employee of the Wasatch Office grab Defendant 
Johnson's crotch from behind. Upon information and belief, 
Johnson was employed as a supervisor at the Wasatch Office 
at the time of this incident. (R. 212). 
30. On or about August 30, 1984, Plaintiff filed a 
charge letter with the EEOC, alleging, in summary, that 
Plaintiff had been harassed by some of her co-workers during 
the preceding year, and that AT&T Management had done nothing 
to remedy the situation despite repeated complaints by Plain-
tiff. (R. 212-213). 
31. During approximately November, 1984, Plaintiff 
received a telephone call at her residence from Alfred A. 
Aros, who was at that time, upon information and belief, an 
investigator for the EEOC. During the ensuing telephone con-
versation, Aros stated to Plaintiff that three of the four 
witnesses whom Aros had interviewed concerning Plaintiff's 
allegations of harassment, had indicated that there was a 
"lesbian problem" at the Wasatch Office. Aros further advised 
Plaintiff that he intended to issue a warning to AT&T 
Management concerning that problem. (R. 213). 
32. During approximately November of 1984, the Office 
of the EEO Coordinator for AT&T administered a survey to the 
- 13 -
employees of the Wasatch Office concerning sexually oriented 
behavior at the work place. On the same day, the Coordin-
ator's Office provided a lecture and film concerning sexual 
harassment in the work place to the employees of the Wasatch 
Office. (R. 213). 
33. On or about December 29, 1984, Gailey and Defen-
dant Johnson, together with one other employee of the Wasatch 
Office, engaged in a conversation within hearing of Plaintiff. 
During said conversation, Plaintiff and Gailey made eye contact, 
whereupon Gailey stated to Plaintiff words to the effect of 
"What are you staring at? Will you stop staring at me." 
Gailey then stated to Johnson words to the effect of, "She 
keeps staring at me." Johnson then looked directly at Plain-
tiff and stated words to the effect of, "She must think we 
look like dead dogs." Upon information and belief, later 
that same evening, Gailey stated to Manager Susan Stedman, 
words to the effect of, "Debi will be upset about what I said." 
(R. 213). 
34. On or about December 30, 1984, Plaintiff wrote 
and delivered to Defendant Bateson-Hough a written complaint, 
in which Plaintiff set forth the incident described in the 
preceding paragraph. (R. 214). 
35. During January, 1985, Bateson-Hough called Plain-
tiff into her office and informed Plaintiff that Bateson-Hough 
had forwarded Plaintiff's written complaint of December 30, 
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1984, to the EEO Coordinator's Office, and had received from 
the EEO Coordinator's Office in response thereto, a letter 
which allegedly reprimanded Plaintiff for her repeated com-
plaints concerning Gailey. Bateson-Hough then stated to 
Plaintiff that Plaintiff was on warning of dismissal as of 
that date, said warning to become part of Plaintiff's per-
manent employment record, and that if Plaintiff continued 
to complain about Gailey, Plaintiff would be terminated. 
Bateson-Hough refused to allow Plaintiff to review the 
alleged letter from the EEO Coordinator's Office, or to 
allow Plaintiff to review her personnel record. (R. 214). 
36. On the same day and immediately prior to Plain-
tiff's having been placed on warning of dismissal by Bateson-
Hough during January of 1985, as referred to within the 
preceding paragraph, Plaintiff observed Bateson-Hough and 
Gailey conversing in a casual manner. Upon noticing Plain-
tiff, Gailey made a smug facial expression towards Plaintiff. 
(R. 215). 
37. Following Plaintiff's conversation with Bateson-
Hough, described in the preceding paragraph, Defendants and 
other employees of the Wasatch Office, continued to harass and 
intimidate Plaintiff by staring at and making hostile facial 
expressions toward Plaintiff, by sitting and walking near 
Plaintiff, and by talking about Plaintiff amongst themselves. 
(R. 215). 
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38. On February 22, 1985, Plaintiff filed a civil 
action in the United States District Court for the State of 
Utah, Central Division, Civil No. 85-189W, which alleged 
violations of Title VII and 42 USC Sec. 1983. On June 11, 
1985, said Complaint was dismissed by Order of the Court, 
per the Honorable David K. Winder, due to Plaintiff's failure 
to respond to AT&T's Motion to Dismiss filed April 9, 1985. 
(R. 90-99). 
39. During approximately March, 1985, meetings were 
held by various managers of the Wasatch Office with each of 
the employees of the Wasatch Office, in groups of two or three 
employees at a time, for the purpose of discussing the results 
of the survey which had been taken by the EEO Coordinator's 
Office during approximately November, 1984. During Plain-
tiff's meeting with Manager Fayonne Johannason, Plaintiff 
was informed by Johannason that the survey had concluded 
that there was a great deal of discussion about sexual 
matters at the Wasatch Office. Johannason further indicated 
that employees of the Wasatch Office should bring incidents 
of offensive behavior to the attention of management, rather 
than allowing such incidents to remain unreported. (R. 215). 
40. Following the issuance of the EEO Coordinator's 
report on the results of the survey which was administered 
during November of 1984, the incidents of offensive conduct 
and communications increased in frequency and offensiveness. 
(R. 216). 
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41. During approximately March, 1985, Appellant over-
heard a conversation wherein Defendant Johnson was speaking 
loudly with another female employee. During said conversa-
tion, Johnson stated to the other employee words to the 
effect of, "I'm really horny, I'm going to go finger my-
self." In response to this comment hy Johnson, the other 
employee stated words to the effect of, "If you need any 
help, I'll be right next door." (R. 216). 
42. During approximately March of 1985, Plaintiff, 
while working at her station, overheard several employees of 
the Wasatch Office, including Johnson, discussing in detail 
their past alleged sexual experiences, including homosexual 
experiences, and including detailed descriptions of sexual 
organs and various sexual activities. Said discussion trans-
pired over a period of approximately 30 minutes. (R. 216). 
43. During approximately April, 1985, Plaintiff, 
acting in her capacity as Union Steward, received several 
complaints from employees of the Wasatch Office, to the 
effect that they had seen Johnson put her hand down the 
blouse of another female employee during work hours. 
(R. 216). 
44. During approximately May, 1985, Bateson-Hough 
instituted a policy whereby some computers would be used 
solely for handling slow calls, while other computers would 
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handle only fast calls. Operators handling the slow compu-
ters would inevitably have a lower productivity than other 
operators. According to r^teson-Hough*s expressed policy, 
each operator should have spent equal time on the slow com-
puters. However, upon information and belief, Plaintiff 
was required to spend far more than an equal share of time 
on the slow computers, with a consequent drop in produc-
tivity rating. (R. 216-217). 
45. On or about June 16, 1985, Plaintiff saw Randall 
approach Johnson from behind, put her arms around Johnson, 
and kiss Johnson for a period of approximately 60 seconds. 
Upon information and belief, Johnson was acting as supervisor 
of the Wasatch Office at the time of this incident. Later 
that same evening, Plaintiff overheard an employee of the 
Wasatch Office ask Johnson if she (i.e., the other employee) 
could eat a brownie while 3he was working on the computer 
board. (Upon information and belief, eating or drinking 
while working was contrary to AT&T policy). In response to 
said request, Johnson stated words to the effect of, "No, 
because there are some people who will tell on me. Isn't 
that right, Debi?" This statement was made while Johnson 
was looking directly at Plaintiff. Plaintiff suffered great 
emotional distress as a result of this incident and was 
required to leave work earLy. (R. 217). 
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46. During approximately July, 1985, Plaintiff began 
to make regular visits to Jerry S. Gardner, a psychoanalyst, 
for the purpose of obtaining treatment for stress and anxiety 
which Plaintiff was suffering as a result of the retaliation 
and harassment to which she was being subjected at the 
Wasatch Office. (R. 218). 
47. On or about August 5, 1985, an employee of the 
Wasatch Office brought a book to work entitled "Joy of Sex". 
Said book was disseminated and discussed among various 
employees of the Wasatch Office, including Johnson, for a 
period of approximately one week. (R. 218). 
48. On or about August 8, 1985, Bateson-Hough alter-
ed the seating arrangements of Wasatch Office employees, 
with the result that Plaintiff would have to sit next to 
persons who were participating in the harassment of Plain-
tiff. (R. 218). 
49. On or about August 15, 1985, Plaintiff witnessed 
two female employees of the Wasatch Office lightly rubbing 
each other's arms while at work for a period of approximately 
several minutes. (R. 218). 
50. During approximately August, 1985, Plaintiff 
obtained a prescription from her physician, Nelson E. Wright, 
M.D., for Mellaril, for treatment of stress and anxiety that 
Plaintiff was experiencing as a result of the harassment to 
which she had been subj ected at the Wasatch Office. (R. 218)• 
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51. On or about August 22, 1985, Gailey moved to a 
position directly in front of Plaintiff and stated to Plain-
tiff words to the effect of, "What are you looking for?" 
(R. 219). 
52. On or about August 24, 1985, Defendants Johnson 
and Randall moved to positions directly in front of Plaintiff. 
While working at such positions, Randall put he^ arm around 
Johnson and stated to Johnson words to the effect of, "It's 
too bad we're being watched all the time." (R. 219). 
53. On or about September 7, 1985, Plaintiff took 
leave from work for medical disability, which disability 
consisted of severe psychological stress and anxiety result-
ing from the harassment Plaintiff had experienced at the 
Wasatch Office. Said medical disability extended from 
September 7, 1985, to the date of Plaintiff's termination 
from AT&T on March 26, 1986. (R. 219). 
54. During November of 1985, Plaintiff was advised 
by her psychiatrist that Plaintiff would be permanently 
unable to return to work with the persons who had been 
harassing Plaintiff. (R. 219). 
55. On or about March 12, 1986, Plaintiff received 
a telephone call from Douglas Erickson, who was then Group 
Manager of the Wasatch Office. Defendant Randall was also 
on the line throughout the ensuing conversation. Erickson 
informed Plaintiff during this conversation that inasmuch 
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as Plaintiff would be medically incapable of continuing her 
employment at the Wasatch Office, Plaintiff would be required 
to transfer for work to Boise, Idaho, such transfer to be 
effective within ten (10) days from the date thereof, in 
order for Plaintiff to continue her employment with AT&T. 
During this conversation, Plaintiff responded to Erickson's 
statement by informing Erickson that it would be impossible 
for Plaintiff to transfer upon such short notice inasmuch as 
Plaintiff was then undergoing psychiatric treatment in Salt 
Lake City for the injuries she had sustained through Defen-
dants' harassment of Plaintiff and inasmuch as Plaintiff's 
minor daughter was attending school in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
In response to these statements by Plaintiff, Randall stated 
words to the effect of, "What do you expect us to do, build 
you a new building?" Erickson responded to Plaintiff's 
statements by informing Plaintiff that Plaintiff's failure 
to report for work in Boise, Idaho, within ten days would 
result in Plaintiff's termination from AT&T. (R. 219-220). 
56. On or about March 28, 1986, Plaintiff received 
a letter from Erickson dated March 26, 1986. In said letter, 
Erickson informed Plaintiff that inasmuch as Plaintiff had 
failed to report for work in Boise, Idaho, by March 23, 1986> 
Plaintiff's employment with AT&T was terminated, effective 
March 26, 1986. (R. 220). 
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57. On July 21, 1988, Plaintiff commenced a civil 
action against AT&T and the individuals named h€?rein as Defen-
dants in the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah, alleging numerous federal and state causes of action, 
including the state claims which are alleged in the present 
action. On March 16, 1989, said action was dismissed by 
Order of the Honorable David K. Winder, U.S. District Court 
Judge, on the grounds that Plaintiff's federal claims were 
barred by limitations. Plaintiff's pendant state claims 
were dismissed without prejudice. (R. 105-112). 
58. On April 5, 1989, Plaintiff commenced the 
present action by filing a Verified Complaint in the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, Civil No. 890902183CV. Said Verified Complaint 
was dismissed by Order of the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
on December 6, 1989. (R. 324-325). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Utah State Supreme Court strongly implied in 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah, 1989), 
that the Court would recognize a common-law cause of action 
for wrongful termination in violation of a clear mandate of 
public policy. Such recognition would be in consonance with 
the trend in a growing number of jurisdictions which have 
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recognized such a cause of action, and is necessary to 
insure that employers do not use their authority to subvert 
subtantial public interests. 
POINT II 
Plaintiff denies that she had a remedy under the col-
lective bargaining agreement for the conduct or injuries 
which are alleged in this action. Even if she had such a 
remedy, there is no reason to deny a cause of action for 
wrongful termination in violation of public policy to con-
tractual employees. The essential reason for recognizing 
such claims is not merely to provide a remedy for otherwise 
remediless employees but to protect substantial interests 
of public policy. Such interests apply equally to at-will 
and contractual employees. Withholding such a remedy from 
contractual employees would have the anomalous effect of 
providing greater protection to at-will employees than to 
contractual employees, and could leave contractual employees 
with remedies which are inadequate to vindicate their essen-
tial rights under state law. 
POINT III 
Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes expressly do not 
pre-empt state remedies which are consistent with the federal 
statutes. The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act (Utah Code Anno-
tated Sec. 34-35-1, et. seq.) expressly excludes retaliation 
- 23 -
from the types of discrimination which are pre-empted by the 
Act. Moreover, even if the UADA were silent or ambiguous on 
the issue of whether a common-law action for retaliatory dis-
charge is pre-empted by the Act, the Court should find that 
such an action is not pre-empted. 
POINT IV 
Plaintiff's claims are not pre-empted by federal labor 
law for the reason that they do not arise from or depend upon 
an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement. Plain-
tiff's claims arise wholly from non-negotiable rights under 
state law, and are completely independent of any right 
established by the collective bargaining agreement. 
POINT V 
Plaintiff was not required to exhaust her contractual 
remedies within the collective bargaining agreement in this 
case because her claims do not arise from or involve the 
collective bargaining agreement. 
POINT VI 
Plaintiff's claims for negligent employment, breach of 
contract, and intentional Lnfliction of emotional distress are 
not barred by limitations because the acts complained of by 
Plaintiff occurred within the applicable statute of limita-
tions . 
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POINT VII 
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. 
POINT VIII 
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim for malicious 
interference with contract. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
UTAH SHOULD RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL 
TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
Defendants argued within page 6 of their Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss, dated June 1, 1989, (hereinafter referred to as "Def-
endants' Memorandum") (R. 60), that Utah does not recognize a 
cause of Action for wrongful termination in violation of public 
policy. However, in Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 
at 1042, Justice Durham stated: 
Perhaps the most logical exception to the 
at-will rule is based upon public policy. 
Where an employee is discharged for a 
reason or in a manner that contravenes 
sound principles of established and sub-
stantial public policy, the employee may 
typically bring a tort cause of action 
against his employer. 
In his concurring opinion in Berube, at page 1050, 
Justice Zimmerman stated: 
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As for the "public policy" exception, I 
agree with the lead opinion that such an 
exception to the at-will presumption should 
be recognized in Utah, even though it is 
not applicable in the present cases 
Thus, it appears that a majority of the Utah Supreme 
Court would recognize a cause of action for wrongful terrain-
1 
ation in violation of public policy in an appropriate case. 
In the present case, the policy which Plaintiff seeks 
to vindicate through her wrongful termination action is the 
policy which prohibits employers from retaliating against 
employees for their rightful resistance to sexual harassment 
and discrimination. Such policy is established within the 
state of Utah by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act which pro-
hibits employers from retaliating against employees who 
reasonably oppose "any employment practice prohibited under 
this chapter....", Utah Code Annotated Sec. 34-35-2(15). 
Such prohibited employment practices include sexual harass-
ment and discrimination. Utah Code Annotated Sec. 34-35-
6(1)(a)(i). Further, the Utah policy against employer 
retaliation was established prior to the enactment of the 
1 
See also Larson v. Sysco Corp., 767 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah, 
1989) (discussing the "public policy exception" under 
Idaho law). A history and analysis of the cause of 
action, and a list of the jurisdictions which recognize 
such actions is provided in Phipps v. Clark Oil, 396 
NW 2d. 588 (Minn. App., 1986). 
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UADD by two sections of the Utah Labor Code (UCA Sections 
34-1-8(1)(f) and 34-4-12), of which the UADD subsequently 
became a part. Finally, the state policy against employer 
retaliation is manifest by the anti-retaliation provision of 
42 USC Sec. 2000e-3. Federal law may serve as an indication 
or basis of state public policy. Adler v. American Standard 
Corp., 538 F.Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982); Johnson v. World Color 
Press, Inc., 498 NE 2d 575 (111. App. 1986). Several courts 
have recognized a cause of action for wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy in situations similar to the present 
2 
case. The policy asserted by Plaintiff in this case is one 
of broad public importance and is well established within the 
State of Utah and throughout the United States. 
POINT II 
A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION 
IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY SHOULD BE 
ALLOWED FOR CONTRACTUAL EMPLOYEES AS 
WELL AS FOR AT-WILL EMPLOYEES 
Defendants assert within pages 6-7 of their Memorandum 
(R. 60-61), and pages 7-11 of Defendants' Reply Memorandum in 
2 
Holien v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292 (Ore. 1984); 
Rojo v. Kliger, 257 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Cal. App. 1989); Savage 
v. Holiday Inn, 603 F.Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1985); Leong 
v. Hilton Hotels, 689 F.Supp 1565 (D. Haw. 1988); Clay 
v. Advanced Computer,, 536 A.2d 1375 (Pa. Super. 1988); 
Ericks on v. Marsh & McLellan, 545 A.2d 812 (N.J. Super. 
1988); Merrell v. All Seasons Resorts, 720 F. Supp. 815 
(D. Cal. 1989); Froyd v. Cook, 681 F. Supp. 669 (D. Cal. 
1988); Avant v. Natl. Bank, 265 NW 2d 410 (Mich. App. 1978). 
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support of their Motion to Dismiss, dated August 14, 1989, 
(hereinafter referred to as "Defendants1 Reply Memorandum") 
(R. 275-279), that Utah should not recognize a cause of action 
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy for 
employees who are covered by an employment contract, and who, 
therefore, have a contractual remedy for wrongful termination. 
In support of their assertion, Defendants make two arguments: 
(1) That recognition of a policy-based action on behalf of 
contractual employees would interfere with the state policy 
which favors private resolution of labor disputes (R. 276-
278), and (2) That the purpose of the policy-based action 
for wrongful termination is merely to provide a remedy for 
otherwise remediless at-will employees, so that there is no 
justification for the allowance of such a claim where an 
employee has a contractual remedy. (R. 275-276). 
Plaintiff denies that she had a remedy under the col-
lective bargaining agreement in this case. Although the 
collective bargaining agreement contains a prohibition 
against sex discrimination (R. 156), it contains no prohi-
bition against retaliation for filing a charge or complaint. 
The collective bargaining Agreement contains a clause requir-
ing cause for termination (R. 65), but that clause was 
ineffectual in this case, where the cause of Plaintiff's 
injuries was not her formal termination but Defendants' 
tortious conduct which prevented Plaintiff from continuing 
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her employment at the Wasatch Office. In the circumstances 
of this case, Plaintiff's termination was simply a conse-
quence or effect of Defendants' prior tortious conduct. 
The collective bargaining agreement contains no provision 
or remedy for these circumstances. 
The present case is similar to the situation which 
existed in Petermann v. International Brotherhood, etc., 
344 P.2d 25 (Cal. App., 1959), wherein the court recogni-
zed a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation 
of public policy even though the plaintiff was a union 
member, because the collective bargaining agreement did 
not provide a remedy for the particular in.iury which had 
been incurred by the plaintiff. In so holding, the court 
stated: 
Since it does not appear in the complaint 
that plaintiff was ever "accused" of any-
thing and disciplinary action thereafter 
taken, he has no right to appeal under 
article XVIII, section 2(a). 
In the present case, as in Petermann. Plaintiff was 
not "disciplined". She was constructively discharged by 
being harassed into a medical disability. These circum-
stances were not contemplated by the collective bargaining 
agreement and could not be effectively remedied through the 
grievance process. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff did have a remedy 
under the collective bargaining agreement, that fact should 
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not prevent Plaintiff from bringing an action for wrongful 
termination based upon public policy. Regarding Defen-
dants* first argument against allowing such an action for 
contractual employees — that it would interfere with the 
state policy favoring private resolution of labor disputes — 
this argument is essentially the same as Defendants1 Sec. 
301 pre-emption argument under Point IV, infra. The state 
policy favoring private resolution of labor disputes is 
the same policy which is furthered and protected by the 
pre-emptive effect of Sec. 301 of the Labor-Management 
Relations Act (LMRA). Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 
471 U.S. 202, 210-212 (1985). Defendants have not argued 
that the Utah policy is broader than the federal policy 
established by Sec. 301. To the contrary, the one Utah case 
cited by Defendants on this issue, Lindon City v. Engineers 
Const. Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah, 1981), (R. 277), in turn 
cites the case of Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 
U.S. 574 (1960), which is a Section 301 case. Moreover, of 
the cases from other Jurisdictions which are cited by Defen-
dants on this point, Durrette v. UGI Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1139 
(D. Pa. 1987) (R. 278), is a Section 301 case, and Lamb v. 
Briggs Manufacturing, 700 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1983), and 
Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 407 NE 2d 97 (111. App. 
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1980) (R.277), each rely upon Steelworkers in defining the 
3 
parameters of state policy. 
Even if the Utah policy favoring private resolution 
of labor contract disputes is broader than the federal policy, 
which Defendants have not alleged, surely that does not mean 
that all civil actions arising in an employment context are 
pre-empted wherever there is a collective bargaining agree-
ment. As with federal labor policy, only claims which rely 
upon or involve a substantial analysis of the collective bar-
gaining agreement must be pre-empted in order to preserve 
the state policy. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S., at 221. Plain-
tiff's claims in the present case do not arise from or require 
an analysis or interpretation of the collective bargaining 
agreement. They arise from independent and non-negotiable 
rights established by state law, and are not pre-empted. 
See Point IV, infra. 
Concerning Defendants' second argument that there is 
no need to recognize a cause of action based upon public 
3 
The case of Herring v. Prince Foods, 611 F.Supp. 177 
(D. N.J. 1985), which was cited by Defendants on this 
point within page 7 of their Memorandum (R. 61), was 
reversed on appeal. Herring v. Prince Macaroni, 711 
F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1986). 
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policy for employees who have a cause of action for breach 
of contract, Plaintiff recognizes that numerous cases have 
described the public policy-based action for wrongful ter-
mination as an exception to the at-will employment rule. 
But the fact that public policy may provide an exception to 
at-will employment is no reason to deny the remedy to con-
tractual employees. The primary reason for the policy-
based cause of action is the concern that employers may 
discipline or terminate their employees for reasons which 
contravene the public welfare, not merely the fact that 
at-will employees are otherwise without a remedy. Phipps, 
396 NW 2d. at 593-594; Ewing v. Koppers Co., 537 A.2d 1173, 
1174-1175 (Md. App. 1988). In most of the cases in which 
the courts have discussed the public policy exception to 
at-will employment, there has simply been no reason for the 
courts to consider whether the public policy-based action 
should be available to contractual employees. Of the cases 
in which the courts have had occasion to consider that 
4 
issue, the vast majority have allowed the cause of action. 
4 
Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309, 1323-1324 (10th Cir. 
1981); Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 473 NE 2d 1280, 1283-
1284 (111. 1984); Lepore v. National Tool & Mfg. Co., 540 
A.2d 1296, 1300-1301 (N.J. Super. 1988); Johnson v. Trans-
world Airlines, Inc., 196 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (Cal. App. 
1983); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 537 A. 2d at 1174-1175. 
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The authorities cited by Defendants on this issue are 
not compelling. In Lamb v. Briggs Manufacturing Co., 700 F.2d 
at 1096, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals applied what it 
clearly considered to be a questionable rule of Illinois law: 
While we might find that such disparities 
between the fruits of successful pursuit of 
tort and contractual remedies warranted the 
creation of an unqualified right of action 
for retaliatory discharge, were we given 
jurisdiction to determine the issue as a 
matter of federal judicial policy, we decline 
to so interpret Illinois law when faced with 
the carefully hedged formulations and 
rationales put forth by the state's 
highest court.... (citations deleted). 
Further, Lamb and Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 
were directly superseded by Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 
473 NE. 2d at 1284 (111. 1984). 
Recognition of a public policy-based claim for wrongful 
termination only for at-will employees would have the anomalous 
effect of providing greater remedies for at-will employees than 
for contractual employees, whose remedies are limited to those 
specified in the contract. Midgett at 1284. Further, the 
public welfare should not be dependent upon the effectiveness 
of contractual procedures and remedies, which may be inade-
quate to protect rights which are established by state law. 
Lepore v. National Tool and Manufacturing Co., 540 A. 2d at 
1301. The public policy against employer retaliation which 
is asserted by Plaintiff in the present case extends equally 
to union and non-union employees, and should be protected to 
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the same extent. Utah Code Annotated Sec. 34-35-2(15); 42 
U.S.C. Seco 2000e-3. Moreover, contractual remedies may be 
inadequate where the employer's conduct rises to the level 
of a tort. Lepore at 1301. 
The distinction urged by Defendants would create prac-
tical problems in enforcement. Under current Utah law, as in 
most jurisdictions, the existence of an implied employment 
contract is a fact-intensive issue, which may be highly un-
predictable in the circumstances of particular cases. Berube 
at 1044. Employees should not be required to accurately 
predict whether thev have a contractual remedy before bring-
ing an action for vindication of their public rights under 
state law. 
In Berube, 771 P.2d, at 1043-1044, note 10, Justice 
Durham stated: 
A cause of action for dismissal in violation 
of public policy must lie for both at-will 
employees and employees for a specified 
term. It would make little sense for at-
will employees to enjoy the protection of 
substantial public policies while employees 
for term were denied them. 
Thus, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the lack 
of a contractual remedy should not be a prerequisite to the 
statement of a claim for wrongful termination in violation 
of public policy. Plaintiff submits that this rule is in 
accordance with the better-reasoned decisions of other 
jurisdictions, which have recognized a tort action that is 
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independent from any contractual remedy that might exist• 
K-Mart Corp. v. Posnock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987); Dare 
v. Montana Petroleum, 687 P.2d 1015 (Mont, 1984); Pompey 
v. General Motors Corp., 180 NW 2d 243 (Mich. 1971). 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION AND 
NEGLIGENT EMPLOYMENT ARE NOT PRE-EMPTED BY 
FEDERAL AND STATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
Defendants asserted within pages 7-11 of their Memo-
randum and page 6, note 4 of their Reply Memorandum (R. 61-
65, 274), that Plaintiff's actions for wrongful termination 
and negligent employment are pre-empted by Federal Anti-
Discrimination Statutes. However, Title VII expressly 
pre-empts only those state laws which are inconsistent with 
Title VII. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-7. The nonpre-emptive 
effect of Title VII extends not only to overlapping statu-
tory remedies for employment discrimination, as contended by 
Defendants at R. 274, but also to state common-law remedies 
which are not inconsistent with Title VII. Savage v. Holiday 
Inn Corp., 603 F. Supp. at 315; Leong v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 
689 F. Supp. at 1567-1568; Clay v. Advanced Computer, 536 A.2d 
at 1381. Defendants have cited no authority to the contrary. 
Defendants also assert within pages 7-11 of their 
Memorandum, and pages 2-7 and 11-13 of their Reply Memorandum 
(R. 61-65: 270-275: and 279-281), that Plaintiff's claims for 
wrongful termination and negligent employment are pre-empted 
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by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, Utah Code Annotated 
Sec. 34-35-1f etc seq. However, the exclusive remedy pro-
vision of the UADA specifically exempts retaliation from the 
types of discrimination for which the Act provides the exclu-
sive remedy. Utah Code Annotated Sec. 34-35-7.1(15) states: 
The procedures contained in this section 
and Sec. 34-35-8 are the exclusive remedy 
under state law for employment discrimin-
ation because of race, color, sex, age, 
religion, national origin, or handicap. 
(Emphasis added). 
The statute specifically identifies the types of dis-
crimination for which it provides the exclusive remedy, and 
excludes retaliation from that list. Defendants interpret 
the statute as though there were a period after the word 
"discrimination" (R. 279), thereby rendering the remainder 
of the sentence superfluous, contrary to established rules 
of statutory construction. Rojo, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 163. 
The exclusion of retaliatory discrimination from the 
UADA's exclusive remedy provision was not a legislative over-
sight. The Utah Legislature was well aware of the existence 
of retaliatory discrimination at the time it enacted the UADA. 
Utah Code Annotated Sec. 34-35-6(1)(a)(i) specifically refers 
to retaliation as a form of discrimination. Utah Code Anno-
tated Sec. 34-35-2(15) provides a detailed definition of the 
word "retaliate" in language which is very similar to the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-3). 
The "Charge of Discrimination" forms which are utilized by 
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the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division list "retaliation" as a 
form of discrimination which is co-equal to the other forms of 
discrimination that are prohibited under the UADA. (R-88, 103). 
The legislative intent to exclude retaliation from the 
UADA's exclusive remedy provision is further indicated by the 
fact that Utah has established multiple remedies for employer 
5 
retaliation. For example, an act of retaliation which is in 
violation of the UADA may also, in particular circumstances, 
constitute a violation of the Utah Constitutional prohibition 
6 
against blacklisting. In order to avoid a conflict between 
the UADA and other state statutory prohibitions against 
employer retaliation, the legislature intentionally excluded 
retaliation from the UADA's exclusive remedy provision. 
The distinction between retaliation and other forms 
of employment discrimination within the UADA's exclusive 
remedy provision is due to the qualitative distinction between 
retaliation and other forms of discrimination. Retaliation 
occurs due to an employee's exercise of her legal rights, 
5 
Const. Utah, Art. XII, Sec. 19 (Blacklisting); Utah Code 
Annotated Sec. 34-35-6(1)(a),(e) (Anti-Discrimination); 
Utah Code Annotated Sections 67-21-1, et. seq. (Whistle 
Blowers' Protection); Utah Code Annotated Sec. 34-28-19 
(Wage Claims); Utah Code Annotated Sec. 34-22-12 (Wage-And-
Hour Disputes). 
6 
Such a fact situation was presented in Rutherford v. 
American Bank of Commerce. 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir., 1977). 
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whereas other forms of discrimination are based upon an 
employee's status. Other courts have found this distinction 
to be significant. In Holien v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 689 
P. 2d at 1300, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the plain-
tiff's claim for wrongful discharge was not pre-empted by the 
existence of an administrative remedy established by statute: 
[I]t is not the supervisor's demand, or 
discriminatory sexual harassment, for 
which plaintiff seeks common-law tort 
damages; it is for a tortious discharge 
following her rightful resistance to 
those demands or harassment. 
In his concurring opinion in Holien, Justice Linde 
stated: 
If plaintiff's tort claim were one for 
"discriminatory discharge," that i3 to 
say, if her claim were that she was dis-
charged by reason of her sex, there would 
be serious doubt that the remedies for 
employment discrimination enacted by the 
legislature leave room for an action for 
damages or that the common law would 
recognize it. But this plaintiff's 
case does not hinge on showing that 
her employer, Sears Roebuck & Co., dis-
charged her by reason of-her sex. Her 
case depends on showing that Sears 
discharged her for exercising a legal 
right to resist a supervisor's sexual 
advances, which is a very different 
thing. 
Similarly, in Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 
F.Supp. 910, 917 (D. Mich., 1977), (cited in Defendants' 
Reply Memorandum at R. 272), the court found the distinc-
tion between retaliation and status discrimination to be 
significant: 
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[Plaintiff] does not claim that she was 
fired because of any affirmative act on 
her part taken in an effort to claim a 
legal entitlement or for her refusal to 
perform an act from which she would be 
protected by public policy. Instead 
she claims that she was fired because 
of her age and/or sex. While it would 
be against public policy if either of 
these reasons were the basis for her 
termination, statutory remedies have 
been provided to protect employees from 
discharge on the basis of sex or age, 
and it is not necessary to expand the 
public policy exception to provide pro-
tection for employees for discharges 
based on status rather than affirmative 
conduct. 
In the present case, Plaintiff has clearly alleged 
retaliation as opposed to sex discrimination. Admittedly, 
the distinction between retaliation and sex discrimination 
is not always clear, and may depend upon the defendant's 
motive rather than upon the content of his acts or communi-
cations. However, in the present case, Plaintiff alleges 
numerous acts which were purely retaliatory in nature, as 
well as several incidents which, while sexually-oriented, 
were intended merely to retaliate. (R. 209-219). 
In support of their UADA pre-emption argument, Defen-
dants cite numerous cases from other jurisdictions, all of 
which are distinguishable from the present case on the grounds 
that the statutory remedies for employment discrimination in 
those cases contained no express exclusivity provision, or 
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contained exclusivity provisions which are very different 
7 
from that of the UADA. Where the statute at issue contains 
Trembath v. St. Regis Paper Co,, 753 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 
1985); Bruffet v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 
910 (3rd Cir. 1982); Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 
448 F.Supp. 910 (D. Mich. 1977); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 
438 F.Supp. 1052 (D. Pa., 1977); Pierce v. New Process 
Co., 580 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Pa. 1984); McCluney v. Jos. 
Schlitz Brewing Co., 489 F. Supp. 24 (D. Wise. 1980); 
Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 623 F. Supp. 295 
(D. Me. 1985); Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F. Supp. 27 
(D. Mass. 1984); Mahoney v. Crocker Natl. Bank, 571 F. 
Supp. 287 (D. Cal. 1983) (erroneously cited in Defen-
dants' Reply Memorandum as "571 F.2d 287") (R. 268, 272). 
The support for Defendants' position is actually not as 
strong as their 9-case list of citations implies. All 
of the cases cited by Defendants involve federal courts 
purporting to apply state law. Three of the cases cited 
by Defendants, Bruffet, Pierce, and Wehr, are Pennsylvania 
cases decided under that state's peculiar statutory pro-
vision which specifically requires exhaustion of the 
administrative remedy once that remedy is invoked, but 
allows plaintiffs to proceed directly to court if they 
choose to forego the administrative remedy. Wehr at 
1055-1056. In California, Mahoney has been superseded 
by Rojo v. Kliger, Froyd v. Cook, and Merrell v. All 
Seasons Resorts (See footnote 2, supra). Schroeder does 
not represent the current state of Michigan law. See 
Holmes v. Haughton Elevator Co., 272 NW 2d. 550 (Mich. 
1978). Crews does not fully reflect Massachusetts law. 
See Treadwell v. John Hancock Inc., 666 F. Supp. 279 
(D. Mass. 1987). Greene was reversed on appeal. See 
Greene v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 764 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 
1985), and was based upon the fact that Maine has not yet 
adopted the "public policy exception". See Pooler v. Maine 
Coal Products, 532 A.2d 1026 (Me. 1987). Trembath and 
McCluney are Wisconsin cases which follow that state's 
very narrow application of the public policy exception. 
See Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 335 NW 2d. 834 
(Wis. 1983) (adopting minority position). Of the cases 
cited by Defendants, only McCluney involved a retaliation 
claim. 
- 40 -
an express exclusive remedy provision, the statutory language 
obviously controls. Lally v. Copygraphics, 413 A,2d 960, 965 
(N.J. App. 1980). 
Nevertheless, Plaintiff recognizes that this Court 
could possibly determine that the UADA is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to whether it pre-empts a common-law action for 
retaliatory termination. In that event, Plaintiff submits 
that the Court should rule in accordance with general princi-
ples of statutory construction and in furtherance of the Utah 
policy against employment retaliation that Plaintiff's wrongful 
termination claim is not pre-empted. 
The issue of whether state statutory remedies for 
employment discrimination which contain no express exclusivity 
provision pre-empt common-law remedies for discrimination has 
been frequently litigated in recent times, with widely dis-
8 
parate results among the jurisdictions. 
8 
Cases which have decided that common-law remedies are not 
pre-empted include those which are cited at note 2, supra. 
See also Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, 543 NE 2d. 
1212 (Ohio 1989); Brewster v. Martin-Marieta Aluminum Sales, 
378 NW 2d. 555 (Mich. App. 1985). The authorities which 
Defendants allege support the proposition that a statutory 
anti-discrimination remedy pre-empts an action for retalia-
tory discharge are identified in note 7, supra. 
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The cases in which a common-law remedy has been held 
to be pre-empted generally identify one or more of five reasons 
for reaching that conclusion, all of which were raised within 
Defendants' memoranda. Those reasons are: (1) The general 
principle that a statutory remedy is presumed to be exclusive 
in the absence of express language to the contrary; (2) Allow-
ance of a common-law action would circumvent the procedures of 
a statutory remedy; (3) Allowance of a common-law action would 
upset the legislative balancing of the interests of employers 
and employees; (4) Allowance of a common-law action could 
result in duplicative administrative and judicial proceedings; 
and (5) Allowance of a common-law action is unnecessary where 
employees have a statutory remedy. 
While these arguments have convinced some jurisdic-
tions that statutory remedies should be exclusive even in the 
absence of express exclusionary language in the? statute (cases 
cited note 7), they have been rejected by the courts which have 
held that common-law remedies are not pre-empte^d (cases cited 
note 8). Plaintiff submits that the arguments advanced in 
favor of exclusion are largely illusory and that sound prin-
ciples of statutory construction and public policy favor the 
allowance of a common-law action for wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy where such actions are not expressly 
precluded by statute. 
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In regard to the argument that statutory remedies are 
generally exclusive (Schroeder, 448 F. Supp. at 914), Plain-
tiff submits that there is no such presumption in the area of 
civil rights legislation, where statutory remedies are con-
strued as being supplemental in order to achieve their remedial 
purposes. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 4836, 
4847-48 (1974); Pompey v. General Motors Corp., 180 NW 2d. 
243, 251 (Mich. 1971). In enacting civil rights legislation, 
the legislature usually intends to broaden, rather than res-
trict, the availability of remedies. Consequently, civil 
rights statutes should be construed as non-exclusive in the 
absence of express statutory language to the contrary• 
Further, the rule of statutory exclusivity applies 
only to rights which are first created by the statute. 
Common-law rights which pre-exist the statutory remedy are 
not pre-empted in the absence of express pre-emptory language 
in the statute. Even the cases which have found in favor of 
9 
pre-emption have recognized this rule. 
In Mahoney and Schroeder, the courts distinguished the 
plaintiffs1 common-law actions for age discrimination from 
9 
Mahoney v. Crocker Natl.Bank, 571 F. Supp. at 293-294; 
Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. at 914. 
Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, 543 NE 2d., at 
1216; Holien v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d at 1303; 
Rojo v. Kliger. 257 Cal. Reptr. at 163. 
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prior state court decisions which allowed wrongful termination 
actions based upon race discrimination. The Court in Mahoney, 
571, 293-294, stated: "Plaintiffs have cited the court to no 
case or statute, prior to the F.S. at CFEHA, which recognized 
a right to be protected from age discrimination,." The Court 
in Schroeder, 448 F. Supp. at 914, stated: "Prior to [the 
creation of the Civil Rights Commission] there was no con-
stitutional prohibition against age or sex discrimination." 
Thus, both Mahoney and Schroeder implied that a common-law 
action for age discrimination would have been available if the 
state policy against age discrimination had been manifest by 
some statute or case decision prior to the enactment of the 
anti-discrimination statute. 
Several California courts have held that common-law 
claims for sex discrimination in employment are not pre-
empted by the state's Fair Employment Act, for the reason 
that the California Constitution provided a right to be free 
from such discrimination prior to the enactment of the Fair 
Employment Act. Rojo, 257 Cal. Rptr., at 166; Merrell, 720 
F. Supp. at 819; Froyd, 681 F. Supp., at 676. In Froyd, at 
675-676, the court further held that the California policy 
against employer retaliation pre-existed the Fair Employment 
Act. See also Rojo at 165. 
The Utah policy against sex discrimination in employ-
ment existed prior to the enactment of the UADA. The 
Constitution of Utah, Article IV, Sec. 1 states: 
- A A — 
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah 
to vote and hold office shall not be denied 
or abridged on account of sex. Both male 
and female citizens of this State shall 
enjoy equally all civil, political, and 
religious rights and privileges. 
This Constitutional provision was identified as the 
basis for the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act's prohibition 
against sex discrimination in private employment in Beehive 
Medical Electronicst Inc., v. Industrial Commission, 583 P.2d 
53, 60 (Utah 1978). Since sex discrimination was prohibited 
in Utah prior to enactment of the UADA, employer retaliation 
for an employee's opposition to such conduct was contrary to 
state policy. Rojo, 257 Cal. Rptr., at 165. Further, the 
original 1953 Utah Labor Code stated: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice... 
to discharge or otherwise discriminate 
against an employee because he has filed 
charges or given testimony under this act. 
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 34-1-8(1)(f). Further, Utah Code 
Annotated Sec. 34-4-12 of the original Labor Code stated: 
An employer who discharges, or threatens to 
discharge, or in any other manner discrim-
inates against any employee because such 
employee has testified or is about to testify, 
or because such employer believes that said 
employee may testify in any investigation or 
proceedings relative to the enforcement of 
this act shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor . 
These provisions predated the UADA and were repealed by the 
1969 amendment to the Labor Code which first enacted the UADA. 
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Thus, the Utah policy against sexual and retaliatory discrim-
ination existed prior to the enactment of the UADA* 
There is nothing in the language or legislative history 
of the UADA which indicates that the Act was intended to supp-
lant existing common-law remedies. To the contrary, in dis-
cussing the UADA, the Utah Legislature repeatedly emphasized 
that the Act was not intended to modify existing law within 
the State of Utah. 
In addition, Title VII of the United States Code pro-
hibited sex discrimination and retaliation prior to the 
enactment of the UADA. Federal law may serve as a basis for 
indicating state public policy. Adler., 538 F. Supp. 572; 
Johnson, 498 NE 2d 575. 
Another exception to the general principle of statutory 
exclusivity exists where the remedy which is created by 
statute is inadequate to compensate for the injuries which 
have been sustained by the plaintiff. This has been a pri-
mary concern in the cases which have rejected the statutory 
10 
"This law makes no pretense to make any changes. In fact, 
it leaves the law exactly the way it is." Speech of 
Senator Buckner, proponent of Senate Bill No. 30, 
February 7, 1969. 
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exclusivity argument. Holien, 689 P.2d at 1303-1304; Rojo, 
257 Cal. Rptr. at 166; Brewster, 378 NW 2d at 568-569. The 
UADA, like Title VII, and most state anti-discrimination 
statutes, provides only for equitable remedies, such as back 
pay and reinstatement. Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc., v. 
11 
Industrial Commission, 583 P.2d, at 59. Such remedies may 
be inadequate where an employee has suffered some personal 
injury, such as severe emotional distress or injury to repu-
tation through the employer's tortious conduct. Wiggins v. 
Eastern Ass. Coal Corp., 357 SE 2d 745, 748 (W. Va., 1987). 
The loss of future income and benefits and compensatory 
damages which may be necessary to make the plaintiff whole 
are unavailable under the UADA, as are punitive damages which 
should be available in extreme cases. Peru Daily Tribune v. 
Shuler, 544 NE 2d 560, 562 (Ind. App., 1989). Given the reme-
dial nature of the UADA and civil rights legislation in general, 
the UADA should not be construed as restricting an employee's 
access to adequate compensation for tortious misconduct. In 
fact, such a construction might place the UADA in violation 
11 
In fact, the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division does not 
have authority to enforce any remedy at all. Utah Code 
Annotated Sec. 34-35-5. Actual enforcement of the UADA's 
prohibitions against employment discrimination is left to 
the District Courts. Utah Code Annotated Sec. 34-35-8. 
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of the "open courts" provision of the Utah Constitution, 
12 
Article I, Section 11. 
In Drinkwalter v. Shipton Supply Company, 732 P.2d 
1335 (Monte 1987), the Montana Supreme Court held that 
common-law actions were not pre-empted by a statutory remedy 
for employment discrimination. The Montana court's primary 
concern was that if the statute provided the exclusive remedy: 
The courthouse would be closed to individuals 
against whom a tort had been committed, thus 
contravening our constitutional right of access 
to the court.... Our citizens' right to a trial 
by jury...would be abridged as well. 
Additionally, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 
Utah Code Annotated Sec. 63-46b-14(1)(b)(i) provides that a 
party is relieved from the requirement to exhaust administra-
tive remedies if such remedies are inadequate. The UADA 
is subject to the provisions of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act. Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 34-35-7.1(10). 
Inasmuch as the UADA provides no remedy for Plaintiff's 
12 
See Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 
(Utah, 1989), wherein the Court held that the limitation 
upon damages for personal injuries caused by governmental 
entities was invalid under Article I, Sec. 11 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
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very real prospective and compensatory damages, the remedies 
provided by the UADA are inadequate in this case. 
The second argument which has been raised in support of 
statutory pre-emption is that allowance of independent common-
law actions would circumvent the administrative remedy 
provided by statute. (Bruffett 692 F.2d at 919). This argu-
ment is a tautology. Nothing is "circumvented" if the 
statutory remedy is cumulative rather than exclusive. 
An employee may simply choose to forego the administrative 
remedy. 
The third argument which is raised in support of pre-
emption, that recognition of a common-law action would upset 
the legislature's "delicate balance" of the interests of 
employers and employees (Greene, 623 F. Supp. at 299; Crews• 
588 F. Supp. at 29), presupposes that such a balancing process 
took place. The two courts which cited this argument merely 
assumed that the statutory remedy was intended to balance the 
interests of employers and employees. 
There is nothing in the language or legislative history 
of the UADA which indicates that the Utah Legislature intended 
to balance the interests of employers and employees in enact-
ing the UADA. The primary purpose of the UADA is to provide 
a remedy for certain forms of employment discrimination. 
Beehive Medical Electronics, 583 P.2d at 60. Employers have 
no legitimate interest in commiting unlawful discrimination* 
- 49 -
Parker v. Baltimore, 652 F.2d 1012, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
Allowing a common-law action would further, not frustrate, 
the legislature's objective* Helmick, 543 NE 2d* at 1216; 
Phipps, 396 NW 2d- at 593-594. 
Plaintiff wishes to emphasize that Title VII of the 
United States Code, which provides the most comprehensive 
legislative procedures against employment discrimination to 
date, has been uniformly held to not pre-empt state common-
law remedies. Leong, 689 F. Supp. at 1567-1568; Savage, 603 
F. Supp. at 315; Clay, 536 A.2d at 1381. 
The fourth argument in favor of pre-emption, that 
concurrent administrative and judicial remedies could lead 
to duplicative proceedings and inconsistent remedies (Crews 
588 F. Supp. at 29), disregards the fact that the adminis-
trative remedy provided by the UADA and similar statutes 
contains no mechanism or authority for enforcement. UADD 
determinations are merely intended to facilitate negotiation 
and compromise. Actual enforcement of the Act is left to 
the courts. UCA Sec. 34-35-8. Any inconsistency between 
concurrent proceedings would be rectified by principles of 
collateral estoppel. 
The fifth argument which has been raised in favor of 
pre-emption is that common-law remedies are not necessary 
where a statutory remedy has been provided. (McCluney, 489 F. 
Supp. at 26-27; Wehr, 438 F. Supp at 1054). The cases that 
have raised this point are older cases which haive relied upon 
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the assumption that the "public policy exception" is available 
only to at-will employees. However, as previously argued 
within Point II hereof, the central inquiry should be upon 
the importance of the asserted policy, and not upon whether 
the employee had some arguably effective alternative remedy. 
The courts which have allowed common-law actions for 
employment discrimination in addition to statutory administra-
tive remedies are sensitive to the pervasiveness, subtlety, 
and injurious nature of employment discrimination in modern 
society, and to the limited effectiveness of administrative 
remedies. In order to fully vindicate the state policy 
against employment retaliation, this Court should recognize a 
cause of action where it has not been excluded by the statute. 
Plaintiff's cause of action for negligent employment 
(R. 10-11), is not pre-empted for the additional reason that 
it does not allege "discrimination" within the meaning of the 
UADA's exclusive remedy provision. Numerous courts, includ-
ing some of those which have held that an action for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy is pre-empted by 
state anti-discrimination statutes, have held that common-law 
tort claims which allege elements distinct from the elements 
13 
of employment discrimination, are not pre-empted• 
13 
Helmick, 543 NE 2d. 1212 (assault, defamation, invasion 
of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
tortious interference and breach of contract); Schroedert 
448 F. Supp. at 917-919 (intentional infliction of 
emotional distress; Pierce, 580 F. Supp. at 1546 
(intentional infliction of emotional distress); Greene, 
623 F. Supp. at 299-300 (breach of contract). 
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In fact, a contrary rule would lead to the untenable result 
that such distinctive tort claims as assault, defamation, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress are pre-empted by 
the statutory administrative remedies for employment discrim-
ination • Utah has long recognized a cause of action for 
negligent employment which has distinctive elements. Birkner 
v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1059 (Utah 1989). 
In Davis v. Utah Power & Light Co., Civ. No. 87-C-0659G 
(D. Utah 1988) (Unpublished Memorandum Decision), the United 
States Court for the District of Utah, per the Honorable J. 
Thomas Greene, held that Davis' claim for negligent employment 
was not pre-empted by the UADA. In so holding, the Court 
stated: 
Because failure to supervise may encompass 
more than acts defined to be "discriminatory 
or prohibited employment practices" under the 
Utah Act, the court concludes that the Act 
does not pre-empt this cause of action. 
Davis at 21-22. 
The essence of Judge Greene's analysis was as follows: 
This court reads the exclusive remedy provision 
of the Act as only foreclosing those common-law 
causes of action which are based upon the very 
conduct which is necessary to prove sexual 
harassment or sex discrimination under the Act, 
namely, conduct expressly prohibited by the Act 
or conduct satisfying all the essential elements 
of a prima facie case. Where the allegation in 
plaintiff's complaint demonstrates that plaintiff 
has suffered a different injury than the Act 
covers, an independent cause of action exists 
outside the Act. Davis at 12-13. 
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In the present case, Plaintiff's allegations of negli-
gent employment go far beyond the essential elements of a 
prima facie case of retaliatory discrimination. Defendants' 
harassment of Plaintiff continued and even increased follow-
ing Plaintiff's complaints to her manager, to AT&T's EEO 
Office, to the EEOC, and even the filing of a Title VII 
complaint in federal court. (R. 90-96, 210-220). Further, 
AT&T's own survey found a prevalence of sexually oriented 
communications at the Wasatch Office, and advised employees 
to report such conduct to AT&T management. (R. 215). These 
facts are sufficient to state a claim for negligent employ-
ment. Carr v. U.S. West Direct, 779 P.2d 154, 157 (Ore. App. 
1989); Kreske v. Rulli, 432 NW 2d 764, 769 (Minn. App. 1988); 
Cox v. Brazo, 303 SE 2d 71, 73 (Ga. App. 1983), aff'd 307 SE 
2d 474 (1983). 
For the same reasons, Judge Greene determined that 
Davis' cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress was not pre-empted by the UADA. Davis, at 17-18. 
In the present case, Defendants have not even alleged that 
Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
14 
distress is pre-empted. 
14 
Plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination in violation 
of public policy differs significantly from the UADA's 
prohibition against retaliatory discrimination in that 
the burden of proof and potential damages are different. 
Helmick, 543 NE 2d at 1216. Moreover, the degree of 
employer culpability necessary to establish the tort 
violation may be greater than that required for a viola-
tion of the UADA. 
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POINT IV 
PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS ARE NOT 
PRE-EMPTED BY FEDERAL LABOR LAW 
Defendants argue within pages 11-18 of their Memo-
randum, and pages 13-17 of their Reply Memorandum (R. 65-71, 
281-285), that all of Plaintiffs claims are pre-empted by 
Section 301 of the LMRA. 
Section 301 has been construed by the federal courts 
as manifesting a Congressional intent that federal law pro-
vide a uniform basis for the interpretation and application 
of collective bargaining agreements. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 
v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1980). Accordingly, state laws 
which conflict or interfere with the federal regulation of 
labor contract disputes are pre-empted by Section 301. Id. 
However, Section 301 does not pre-empt all state regulations 
which touch or concern the inter-relationship between employ-
ers, employees, and unions. Allis-Chalmers, at 208, note 4. 
Only claims which are "inextricably intertwined with consi-
deration of the terms of the labor contract" are pre-empted 
Allis-Chalmers, at 216. The central question in each case 
is whether the state claim concerns some issue about which 
the parties were free to bargain, or whether it derives from 
some non-negotiable right under state law. Id. 
The United States Supreme Court recently expounded 
upon Allis-Chalmers in a context similar to the present case. 
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In Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 1877 
(1988), the plaintiff filed a common-law action for retalia-
tory discharge in an Illinois state court, alleging that she 
had been terminated for filing a worker's compensation claim. 
The plaintiff simultaneously pursued an arbitration remedy 
within the collective bargaining agreement. The employer 
removed the state court action to federal court and moved for 
dismissal on the grounds that plaintiff's common-law action 
was pre-empted by Sec. 301 of the LMRA. The Court of Appeals 
for the 7th Circuit upheld the District Court's dismissal of 
the retaliatory discharge action on the grounds of Sec. 301 
pre-emption because "the same analysis of the facts" was 
involved in both the tort action and the plaintiff's arbitra-
tion proceeding under the collective bargaining agreement. 
Lingle, at 1879. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding: 
[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to 
a collective-bargaining agreement, on the 
one hand, and state law on the other, would 
require addressing precisely the same set 
of facts, as long as the state-law claim 
can be resolved without interpreting the 
agreement itself, the claim is "independent" 
of the agreement for Section 301 pre-emption 
purposes. 
Of particular relevance to the present case, the Lingle 
court stated: 
Section 301 does not pre-empt state anti-
discrimination laws, even though a suit 
under these laws, like a suit alleging 
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retaliatory discharge, requires a state 
court to determine whether just cause existed 
to justify the discharge. The [Court of 
Appeals] distinguished those laws because 
Congress has affirmatively endorsed state 
anti-discrimination remedies in Title VII... 
whereas there is no such explicit endorsement 
of state worker's compensation laws.... [T]his 
distinction is unnecessary for determining 
whether Sec. 301 pre-empts the state law in 
question. The operation of the anti-discrim-
ination laws does, however, illustrate the 
relevant point for Sec. 301 pre-emption 
analysis that the mere fact that a broad 
contractual protection against discrimination --
or retaliatory — discharge may provide a remedy 
for conduct that coincidentally violates state 
law does not make the existence or the contours 
of the state Law violation dependent upon the 
terms of the private contract. For even if an 
arbitrator should conclude that the contract 
does not prohibit a particular discriminatory 
or retaliatory discharge, that conclusion might 
or might not be consistent with a proper inter-
pretation of state law. In the typical case, 
a state tribunal could resolve either a dis-
criminatory or retaliatory discharge claim 
without interpreting the "just cause" language 
of a collective bargaining agreement. Lingle, 
at 1885 (citations deleted). 
Plaintiff submits that Lingle effectively disposes of 
Defendants' Sec. 301 pre-emption argument with respect to 
Plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination in violation of 
public policy. 
With respect to Plaintiff's tort claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, it is well established that 
such claims are not pre-empted by Section 301 where the 
alleged emotional distress either is unrelated to employment 
discrimination, or arises from the particularly abusive manner 
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15 
in which such discrimination is performed. Defendants con-
ceded this point on page 17 of their Reply Memorandum (R. 285). 
However, Defendants assert that "The alleged discrimination 
does not rise to the level of being particularly abusive...." 
Plaintiff submits that the allegations contained within her 
Affidavit (R. 209-220), are sufficient to at least create an 
issue of fact as to whether Defendants' conduct was "particu-
larly abusive". Moreover, Plaintiff has not had an opportunity 
to fully develop the facts of this case, due to its summary 
dismissal by the District Court. Placos v. Cosmair, Inc., 
517 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (D. N.Y., 1981). 
Plaintiff's tort claim for negligent employment also 
arises entirely from independent state law. Utah has long 
recognized a distinctive tort action for negligent employment. 
Stone v.Hurst Lumber Co., 386 P.2d 910 (Utah 1963). The neg-
ligence which is alleged by Plaintiff in this case is not 
AT&T's negligence in carrying out its contractual obligations 
under the collective bargaining agreement, but in allowing 
the individual Defendants to violate the state law and policy 
15 
Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 
305 (1977); Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways, 825 F,2d 133, 
137 (7th Cir., 1987); Veal v. Kerr-McGee Coal Corp., 682 F. 
Supp. 957, 962 (D. 111. 1988); Paradis v. United Technology, 
672 F. Supp. 67, 70 (D. Conn. 1987). 
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which prohibits employment discrimination and retaliation. 
Resolution of this claim requires consideration of the scope 
of the state policy against employment discrimination, and 
the application of common-law principles of negligence. It 
does not require any reference to the collective bargaining 
agreement. 
In an attempt to tie Plaintiff's state law claim for 
negligent employment to an analysis of the collective 
bargaining agreement, Defendants assert on page 18 of their 
Memorandum (R. 72), that: 
In order to decide the negligent retention claim, 
it must be determined whether AT&T acted approp-
riately in dealing with Gailey, Johnson, and 
Randall. Since the negligent retention claim is 
dependent upon a consideration of the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement, that claim is pre-empted by 
federal law. 
The present case does not require a determination of 
whether AT&T acted appropriately in "dealing" with the indivi-
dual Defendants, because AT&T did not take any action toward 
the individual Defendants. The fact is that AT&T made no 
effort to stop the retaliation, despite repeatesd complaints 
by Plaintiff. Having failed to utilize its right to discipline 
the individual Defendants, AT&T should not now be allowed to 
invoke the disciplinary procedures of the collective bargain-
ing agreement as a bar to Plaintiff's state law claims. 
Defendants' memoranda contain numerous rote assertions 
that determination of Plaintiff's state law claims would 
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require an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement, 
but provide no indication of how or why such an analysis may 
be necessary. 
Plaintiff's breach of contract claim arises from AT&T's 
breach of its independent contractual obligation under the 
terms of the Code of Conduct, and has no reference to the col-
lective bargaining agreement. It is well established that 
the existence of a collective bargaining agreement does not 
in and of itself preclude the formation of an independent 
employment contract. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 107 S.Ct. 
2425 (1987); Malia v. RCA Corp. 794 F.2d 909 (3rd. Cir. 1986); 
Transportation-Communication Employees v. Grand Trunk RR, 679 
F.Supp 696 (D. Mich. 1988); Whipple v. Independent School 
Dist. , 424 NW 2d 559 (Minn. App. 1988). Only those indepen-
dent contracts which are inconsistent with the terms of the 
collective bargaining agreement are pre-empted. Caterpillar, 
16 
Inc. v. Williams at 2432. 
16 
The only case cited by Defendants which discusses this 
issue is Eitmann v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 
730 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1984). Eitmann recognizes 
the general rule that only independent contracts 
which are inconsistent with the terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement are pre-empted under 
Sec. 301. Eitmann at 361. However, in Eitmann 
the alleged independent contract was held to be 
inconsistent with the collective bargaining agree-
ment, and was, therefore, pre-empted. 
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Defendants have made no claim that the provisions 
within the Code of Conduct prohibiting sexual harassment and 
retaliation are inconsistent with any term of the collective 
bargaining agreement. Moreover, determination of Plaintiff's 
claim for breach of contract does not require an analysis of 
the collective bargaining agreement. The Code of Conduct 
contains no reference to the collective bargaining agreement, 
nor does the collective bargaining agreement refer to the 
Code of Conduct. The Code of Conduct establishes an indepen-
dent remedy — AT&T's EEO Office — which is not provided 
for or even referred to within the collective bargaining 
agreement. The Code of Conduct contains no reference to 
the LMRA, although it does contain a section on "Laws Affect-
ing Our Business." (R. 137). Plaintiff twice initiated 
charges with AT&T's EEO Office, pursuant to the Code of 
Conduct, and the Union was not involved in either of those 
proceedings (R. 210-214, 238-239). 
On page 16 of their Reply Memorandum (R. 284), Defen-
dants attempt to distinguish the authorities cited in support 
of Plaintiff's independent contract claim on the grounds that 
the individual contracts in the cases cited by Plaintiff 
involved a "management position outside the bargaining 
unit." However, the distinction made by Defendants is not 
apparent within the cases cited by Plaintiff. To the contrary, 
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in Caterpillar, Inc., v. Williams, 107 S. Ct., at 2436, the 
court stated: 
[A] plaintiff covered by a collective-
bargaining agreement is permitted to 
assert legal rights independent of 
that agreement, including state-law 
contract rights, so long as the contract 
relied upon is not a collective-bargaining 
agreement. (Emphasis in original). 
Much of the discussion which occurs within the section 
of Defendants' Memorandum which purports to address the issue 
of Sec. 301 pre-emption of Plaintiff's breach of contract 
claim, actually focuses upon the question of whether Plain-
tiff's breach of contract claim states a claim for relief. 
Defendants' Memorandum at pages 16-17 (R. 70-71). The 
essence of Defendants' argument is that "The parties did 
not intend for the Code of Contract to be an independent 
agreement...." However, the Defendants cited no facts in 
support of this conclusion. Plaintiff submits that a sub-
stantial issue of fact exists concerning whether the parties 
intended the Code of Conduct to be an independent contract. 
It is well established in Utah law that an employer's 
employment manual or similar publication may give rise to an 
implied contract of employment. Berube at 1044-1046. 
Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College. 636 P.2d 1063 
(Utah 1981). The existence of such an implied contract of 
employment is a fact-intensive question, which requires 
consideration of the entire circumstances of the employment* 
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Summary Judgment is generally improper in an action which 
alleges breach of an implied employment contract. 
Plaintiff submits that if ever there were a case where 
an employer's employment manual could give rise to an implied 
contract, the present case is it. The provisions within the 
Code of Conduct which prohibit sexual harassment (R. 119), 
and retaliation (R. 140), are mandatory and unequivocal. The 
Code of Conduct establishes a remedial process consisting of 
AT&T's EEO Office (R. 119), which Plaintiff utilized on two 
occasions. (R. 210, 214). Plaintiff was required to review 
and sign the Code of Conduct at the commencement of her 
employment with AT&T and once per year thereafter. (R. 205). 
Plaintiff believes that each employee of AT&T was required to 
endorse the Code of Conduct on a yearly basis as a condition 
of their continued employment. (R. 205). There is no dis-
claimer of contractual obligation within the Code of Conduct. 
Plaintiff submits that these facts are sufficient to create 
a material issue as to whether the Code of Conduct gave rise 
to an independent employment contract. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE 
SECTION 301 LMRA STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR 
BY FAILURE TO EXHAUST CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES 
Defendants argued within pages 20-22 of their Memorandum 
(R. 74-76), that Plaintiff's claims are barred for failure to 
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exhaust her remedies under the collective bargaining agreement. 
Within pages 17-18 of their Reply Memorandum, Defendants argued 
that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the 6-month Statute of 
17 
Limitations of LMRA Section 301. 
Neither of these arguments is distinguishable from 
Defendants' Section 301 pre-emption argument. Section 301*3 
6-month Statute of Limitations is not applicable in this case, 
because Plaintiff has not made any claim under Section 301. 
Taylor v. Tsekeris, 516 NW 2d 562 (111. App. 1981). Plain-
tiff was not required to prove, or even allege exhaustion of 
remedies because her claims do not arise from the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement. Burgess v. Chicago Sun Times, 476 NE 2d 
1284 (111. App. 1985). These arguments merely constitute a 
reiteration of Defendants' Section 301 pre-emption argument, 
and an attempt to create an issue involving analysis of the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement where there is none. 
POINT VI 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENT EMPLOYMENT, 
BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT, AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
ARE NOT BARRED BY LIMITATIONS 
Defendants allege within page 22 of their Memorandum and 
page 18-19 of their Reply Memorandum (R. 76, 286-287), that 
17 
Neither of these arguments was included within Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss of June 1, 1989 (R. 47-48), although they 
are actually subsumed within Defendants1 Section 301 pre-
emption argument. 
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Plaintiff's claims for negligent employment, breach of contract, 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress are barred by 
limitations. The parties agreed that these claims are governed 
by the 4-year Statute of Limitations established by Utah Code 
Annotated, Sec. 78-12-25(2) (R. 76). 
Defendants misconstrue the date upon which the subject 
claims accrued. Defendants state within their Memorandum at 
page 22 (R. 76), that: 
Any claim of negligent retention, breach of 
implied contract, or intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, which Plaintiff arguably 
had against Defendants accrued at the time 
Plaintiff first was harassed or discriminated 
against by Defendants. 
Contrary to Defendants' assertion, Plaintiff's claims 
for negligent employment, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and breach of contract did not accrue at the time 
that Plaintiff "first was harassed or discriminated against". 
Such claims accrued when the individual Defendants retaliated 
against Plaintiff, after Plaintiff expressed her opposition to 
Defendants' conduct to AT&T during approximately May of 1984. 
In addition, Plaintiff's Affidavit and Verified Complaint 
allege numerous specific incidents of retaliatory conduct, 
which either constituted a continuing violation or a series 
of independent torts. Such conduct continued up until the 
time of Plaintiff's termination from AT&T during March of 
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1986, which is well within the limitations period. Leong v. 
18 
Hilton Hotels, 689 F. Supp. at 1568. 
POINT VII 
PLAINTIFF HAS SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED A CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
Plaintiff submits that the allegations contained within 
her Verified Complaint and the facts set forth within her 
Affidavit are more than sufficient to state a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress under the 
standard set forth in Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 
(Utah, 1961). 
POINT VIII 
PLAINTIFF HAS SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED CLAIMS FOR 
MALICIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 
In regard to Plaintiff's claims for interference with 
contract, Defendants argued that Bateson-Hough, as a manage-
ment employee of AT&T, could not be liable for interfering 
with a contract of AT&T. (R. 78-79, 287-288). 
18 
The Statute of Limitations upon these claims should be 
tolled during the pendency of Plaintiff's prior federal 
court action, which was basically identical to the pre-
sent action except for the addition of several federal 
claims. Lee v. Grand Rapids Bd. of Ed., 389 NW 2d 165 
(Mich. App., 1986). Plaintiff's prior federal court 
action was filed on August 24, 1988, and was dismissed 
due to limitations on March 11, 1989. (R. 105-113, 311). 
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Plaintiff acknowledges the general principle that a 
party cannot interfere with its own contract, and that this 
principle generally extends to agents of the contracting 
parties as well. However, it is equally well established 
that agents may be liable for interference where they act 
out of purely personal motives, such as malice. Plaintiff 
cited several cases on this point which were not addressed 
19 
by Defendants. (R. 312-313). 
The existence of a purely personal motive, such as 
malice, is an issue of fact. Placos at 1290; Lindsey v. 
Dempsey, 735 P.2d 840, 845 (Ariz. App. 1984). Defendants 
asserted below that "Bateson-Hough was acting for and on 
behalf of AT&T." (R. 289). This is a factual assumption 
which is not apparent from the record. Plaintiff should be 
allowed to inquire into Bateson-Hough*s motives for her 
treatment of Plaintiff, as alleged within Plaintiff's 
Affidavit. (R. 214-215). 
19 
There have been numerous cases recognizing at cause of 
action for interference with an employment contract by 
co-workers, including management co-workers, in addition 
to those cited within Plaintiff's memoranda. Placos v. 
Cosmair, Inc., 517, at 1290; Treadwell v. John Hancock Co., 
666 F. Supp., at 290; Q E R, Inc. v. Hickerson, 880 F.2d 
1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 1989); Sorrells v. Garfinkle's, et al, 
565 A.2d 285 (D.C. App. 1989); McNamara v. City of Chicago, 
700 F. Supp. 917, 920 (D. 111. 1988); Hobsort v. McLean 
Hosp. Corp., 522 NE 2d 975 (Mass. 1988). 
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Defendants' other argument concerning Plaintiff's 
interference claims is that Plaintiff failed to allege 
that Defendants "conspired with or persuaded another" to 
interfere with the contract between Plaintiff and AT&T, 
which allegation Defendants construe as being necessary to 
state a cause of action for interference. (R. 80-82, 290). 
Plaintiff submits that her Verified Complaint and 
Affidavit do allege such conduct. (R. 209, 215). More 
importantly, Plaintiff submits that it is not necessary 
to allege that Defendants "conspired with or persuaded 
another" to state a claim for interference. The case of 
Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), contains 
a lengthy discussion of the various interference torts, of 
which one of the most salient points is the court's recog-
nition that interference is a fluid concept which cannot be 
pigeon-holed into a list of "elements". Leigh Furniture at 
301. See also 45 Am.Jur.2d, Interference, Sec. 1. In fact, 
the language which Defendants purported to quote from the 
Leigh Furniture opinion within page 27 of their Memorandum 
(R. 81), appears nowhere within the Leigh Furniture opinion. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Plaintiff wishes to emphasize that Motions to Dismiss 
and for Summary Judgment are generally disfavored in the law, 
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because they preclude consideration of the merits of a plain-
tiff's claims« Based upon the authorities and arguments set 
forth herein, Plaintiff requests that this Honorable Court 
reverse the Order of the District Court dismissing Plaintiff's 
claims, and remand for further proceedings• 
DATED this *| day of May, 1990. 
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